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ABSTRACT
The Bill of Rights, The Framers, and the Ninth 
Amendment is an examination of current arguments for and 
against expanded recognition of the Ninth Amendment and 
unenumerated rights by the judiciary. A brief history of 
the Ninth Amendment is included. Also explored are the 
debates between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists on the 
need for a bill of rights, and how the Ninth Amendment could 
resolve this conflict.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT..........................................iii
CHAPTER 1 THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTI-FEDERALISTS . . . .  1
Introduction .................................... 1
The Debate Over a Bill of Rights............. 1
Who Was Right?............................... 3
The Federalists ................................ 6
A Bill of Rights is Unnecessary.............  6
The Limiting Nature of Lists and Language . . . .  7
A Bill of Rights is Dangerous...............  8
The Anti-Federalists ............................ 10
A Legal Check .................................. 11
Educating the People......................... 11
A Written Document .............................. 12
A Protection Against Future Abuses .............. 13
A Rebuttal to the Federalists...............  14
CHAPTER 2 BOTH SIDES REEXAMINED .................... 15
Anti-Federalist Victories ...................... 15
Fears of the Federalists Realized...........  16
The Constitutionality of Unenumerated Rights . . .  19
Answering the Federalists ...................... 21
Answering the Anti-Federalists .................. 25
The History of the Ninth Amendment...........  27
The Ninth Amendment and States' Rights .......... 36
Early Protection for Unenumerated Rights ........ 40
CHAPTER 3 A WORKING THEORY.......................... 41
Defining Unenumerated Rights .................... 41
The Presumption of Liberty...................  44
Unenumerated Rights Are Similar to Listed Rights . 46
Recognition of Unenumerated Rights .............. 48
Originalism and the Constitutionality of Judicial
R e v i e w .................................  54
The Undemocratic Nature of Judicial Review . . . .  56
Removing Issues from Public Debate ............... 58
Personal Biases of Judges .................... 59
Controls on the Judiciary.....................  62
Judicial Restraint and Activism ................ 64
The Future of the Ninth Amendment...........  66
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 69
iv
CHAPTER 1
THE FEDERALISTS AND ANTI-FEDERALISTS 
Introduction
Over two hundred years after the adoption of the 
Constitution of the United States, the necessity, or even 
usefulness of the Bill of Rights appears to be a settled 
question. Debate currently centers on the particulars: the
refining of exactly what each guarantee provided in the 
first ten amendments to the Constitution really means. The 
need for or desirability of a bill of rights in the first 
place is today an uncontested issue; yet the dispute was not 
so uniformly decided when the Constitution was crafted and 
set before the citizenry for ratification in the late 1780s.
The Debate Over a Bill of Rights
When the 1787 Convention convened and the proposed 
Constitution was turned over to the states for ratification, 
the lack of a bill of rights became the major point of 
dissatisfaction with the people (Van Loan III 1989). As 
Irving Brant noted, "No sooner had the Continental Congress 
laid the proposed Constitution before the people for
1
ratification than a great cry went up: it contained no bill
of rights" (Storing 1985, 15). Public opinion was firmly in
favor of a bill of rights (Rutland 1985, 2). In defense of
the Constitution without a bill of rights, the Federalists
argued that a bill of rights would be unnecessary. The
proposed government would have the power to act only in the
areas in which it had expressly delegated powers (Levy 1987,
266). As James Wilson said, "everything which is not given,
is reserved" to the people or the states (Levy 1987, 266).
The second argument the Federalists employed was that a bill
of rights would not only be unnecessary, but dangerous
(Rossiter 1961, 513). James Wilson, among others, believed
that listing rights would imply government power over any
unlisted rights (Levy 1987, 267). Wilson argued,
If we attempt an enumeration [of rights], every 
thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be 
given. The consequence is that an imperfect 
enumeration would throw all implied power into the 
scale of the government, and the rights of the 
people would be rendered incomplete (Cooper 1991, 
423) .
But as Randy Barnett wrote in his article "A Ninth Amendment 
for Today's Constitution," the Anti-Federalists effectively 
turned this argument against the Federalists, observing that 
there were several rights listed in the body of the 
Constitution, such as a prohibition on ex post facto laws or 
bills of attainder, yet other rights considered fundamental 
were not listed (Barnett 1993, 178). The Anti-Federalists, 
on the other hand, believed the Constitution should not be
3ratified since it left so many basic rights unprotected.
The Anti-Federalist argument was ultimately persuasive to 
the people, thus the Federalists conceded the point, and 
promised that a bill of rights would be proposed after 
ratification of the Constitution (Barnett 1993, 178).
Of course, the Constitution was ratified, but the 
intended bill of rights was not immediately forthcoming. 
James Madison repeatedly attempted to put the matter before 
the House of Representatives, but it was often swept aside 
in favor of discussing a tax bill or other matters. 
Eventually, Madison got a Select Committee of the House to 
consider proposed amendments to the Constitution. Ten of 
these were eventually modified and adopted as the Bill of 
Rights (Barnett 1993).1
Who Was Right?
In retrospect it appears that the Anti-Federalists were 
correct when they reasoned that a bill of rights was 
necessary to ensure the rights of the people; the fact that 
it was ever a question at all is something of a historical 
footnote. Yet the arguments on both sides are still 
compelling and may offer insight as to how the Bill of
10ne of these proposed amendments was finally ratified on 
May 7, 1992, as the Twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution. 
It reads, "No law, varying the compensation for the services of 
the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an 
election of representatives shall have intervened" (DeBenedictis 
1992) .
Rights can best be utilized currently. The Bill of Rights 
itself contains the tool necessary to quell the fears and 
provide the advantages of both sides of the debate two 
centuries ago. That device is the Ninth Amendment. The 
Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, "The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people" (U.S. Constitution, Amendment IX). Hidden within 
this often ignored clause is the key to reconciling the 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions, for it can serve 
each of these masters ably, if only given the power 
and recognition to do so.
In order to make the potential role of the Ninth 
Amendment clear, I will analyze the arguments of the 
Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, and the debate 
concerning the need for a bill of rights. By examining 
arguments from both sides, I will show that the Ninth 
Amendment can help to resolve the difficulties pointed out 
by either position. The history of the Ninth Amendment is 
also explored, along with contemporary debates about the 
problems associated with determining the meaning and 
applicability of the Ninth Amendment, as well as the 
conflict over judicial review. Finally, I argue that the 
Ninth Amendment can effectively secure unenumerated rights 
through the interpretive theory of the presumption of 
liberty.
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The Federalists
The Federalists attempted to defend the proposed 
Constitution absent a bill of rights with several arguments 
First they claimed that a bill of rights under the new 
system would be unnecessary, second that words were not 
capable of protecting rights completely, and finally that a 
bill of rights would be dangerous.
A Bill of Rights is Unnecessary
The Federalists initially argued that the Constitution 
needed no bill of rights because it would be a government 
that would be concerned with "general interests of the 
nation," not the private rights of individual citizens 
(Rossiter 1961, 513). The proposed government was one of 
limited powers that could act only in proscribed areas. As 
James Wilson argued, the government is one of specific 
enumerated powers, unlike the state governments whose broad 
grants of power made bills of rights desirable (Storing 
1985, 23). A limited government constrained by its 
enumerated powers is not in need of a bill of rights to 
protect citizens' private rights. This argument is weak 
considering that governments, and according to Madison and 
others, the legislatures in particular, were known to 
attempt to assume and amass powers well beyond any 
proscribed limits. Considering post-adoption judicial 
decisions such as McCulloch v. Maryland (17 U.S. 316),
7governmental powers have grown to be near limitless, 
especially as to implied powers. For example, the Commerce 
Clause has been interpreted to allow legislation on anything 
from civil rights, kidnapping, and pollution, to wages and 
prices throughout the several states (Rossum and Tarr 1991, 
230-1).
The Limiting Nature of 
Lists and Language
The Federalists also argued that an incomplete list of 
rights could imply governmental power over any rights not 
listed. They coupled this with the argument that language 
and practicality make enumerating every right of human 
beings impossible. As Justice James Iredell said, "it would 
be impossible to enumerate every one. Let any one make what 
collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will 
immediately mention twenty or thirty rights not contained in 
it" (Barnett 1993, 2:7). And James Wilson noted, "Enumerate 
all the rights of men? I am sure, sir, that no gentleman in 
the late Convention would have attempted such a thing" (Shaw 
1990, 52). He also argued that "an omission in the 
enumeration of the powers of the government is neither so 
dangerous nor important as an omission in the enumeration of 
the rights of the people" (Cooper 1991, 423). Alexander 
Hamilton not only recognized the futility of trying to list 
all rights, but indicated that language itself was imperfect 
to the task when he wrote, "But no language is so copious as
8to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so
correct as not to include many equivocally denoting
different ideas" (Rossiter 1961, 229). And "What is the
liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which
would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion?" (Rossiter
1961, 524). This is persuasive reasoning by the
Federalists, for as Thomas Hobbes wrote in the Leviathan,
. . . there is no Commonwealth in the world 
wherein there be rules enough set down for the 
regulating of all the actions and words of men (as 
being a thing impossible): it followeth
necessarily that in all kinds of actions, by the 
laws pretermitted, men have the liberty of doing 
what their own reasons shall suggest for the most 
profitable to themselves (Olafson 1961, 104).
The Constitution, not just the Bill of Rights, uses broad, 
vague language, such as the necessary and proper clause, to 
allow adaptation, and to avoid the limiting nature of more 
precise words.
A Bill of Rights is Dangerous
The Federalists bolstered these arguments with the 
claim that a bill of rights could be dangerous. Alexander 
Hamilton wrote of the treacherous nature of a bill of 
rights:
They would contain various exceptions to powers 
which are not granted; and, on this very account, 
would afford a colorable pretext to claim more 
than were granted. For why declare that things 
shall not be done which there is no power to do? 
Why, for instance, should it be said that the 
liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when 
no power is given by which restrictions may be 
imposed? (Rossiter 1961, 513-4).
9James Wilson concurred, stating that,
In a government possessed of enumerated powers, 
such a measure would be not only unnecessary, but 
preposterous and dangerous. Whence comes this 
notion, that in the United States there is no 
security without a bill of rights? Have the 
citizens of South Carolina no security for their 
liberties? They have no bill of rights . . . .
The state of New Jersey has no bill of rights.
The state of New York has not [sic) bill of rights 
. . . . In all societies, there are many powers 
and rights which cannot be particularly 
enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a 
constitution is an enumeration of the powers 
reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every 
thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be 
given (Shaw 1990, 46).
As Justice James Iredell said at the time,
[I]t would not only be useless, but dangerous, to 
enumerate a number of rights which are not 
intended to be given up; because it would be 
implying, in the strongest manner, that every 
right not included in the exception might be 
impaired by government without usurpation (Barnett 
1993, 2:7).
James Madison, in a letter penned in 1788 to Thomas 
Jefferson, wrote that he viewed a bill of rights as 
unimportant,
because experience proves the inefficacy of a bill 
of rights on those occasions when its controul 
[sic] is most needed. Repeated violations of these 
parchment barriers have been committed by 
overbearing majorities in every State (Mason and 
Baker 1985, 287).
In the same missive, Madison argued that essential rights,
and "the rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to
public definition would be narrowed much more than they are
likely ever to be by an assumed power" (Mason and Baker
1985, 287) .
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James Wilson, in a speech advocating the adoption of
the Constitution in 1787 paired the two Federalist arguments
against a bill of rights when he stated,
In truth, then, the proposed system possesses no 
influence whatever upon the press, and it would 
have been merely nugatory to have introduced a 
formal declaration upon the subject - nay, that 
very declaration might have been construed to 
imply that some degree of power was given, since 
we undertook to define its extent (Ketcham 1986, 
184-5).
As Madison himself stated when he presented the Ninth 
Amendment for ratification, this was the most persuasive 
argument against adoption of a bill of rights. The listing 
of certain rights, to the exclusion of others, can imply 
that those enumerated are the only rights protected.
Madison hoped to solve this problem with the addition of the 
Ninth Amendment.
The Anti-Federalists
The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, argued that 
the want of a bill of rights was grounds for rejecting the 
proposed constitution. Jefferson, in a letter to James 
Madison in 1787, wrote that "a bill of rights is what the 
people are entitled to against every government on earth, 
general or particular, and what no just government should 
refuse, or rest on inference" (Peterson 1975, 285).
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A Legal Check
The Anti-Federalists furnished several arguments as to 
why a bill of rights was essential. First, a bill of rights 
provides the judiciary a legal check on the other branches. 
In a letter to Madison dated March 15, 1787, Jefferson 
wrote, "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of 
rights, you omit one which has great weight with me, the 
legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary" 
(Peterson 1975, 438). Alluding to judicial review,
Jefferson urged Madison to recognize that the people will 
have recourse to challenge abuses of their rights by 
appealing to the courts, and citing the Bill of Rights for 
their legal claims for relief.
Educating the People
A bill of rights could provide people with information 
and the idea and sentiment that they have these rights. 
Knowing these rights, the people would want them protected, 
and take their causes to court (Barnett 1989, 23) . Changing 
from his original view of a bill of rights as dangerous, 
Madison urged that a bill of rights would give the people 
something to point to, to educate them, and to "impress some 
degree of respect for them, to establish public opinion in 
their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community" 
(Barnett 1989, 58). Again, in a letter to Jefferson,
Madison sustained that,
12
The political truths declared in that solemn 
manner acquire by degrees the character of 
fundamental maxims of free Governments, and as 
they become incorporated with the national 
sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and 
passion (Mason and Baker 1985, 288).
As Edmund Randolph stated, "a perpetual standard should be
erected around which the people might rally, and by a
notorious record be forever admonished to be watchful, firm,
and virtuous" (Storing 1985, 31).
A Written Document
A bill of rights, like a written constitution, becomes 
a uniform, written document to which all may appeal, and 
which endures through time. The Pennsylvania Minority's2 
first objection to the Constitution was its lack of a bill 
of rights (Ketcham 1986, 247). A bill of rights, laying 
down firmly the rights of human beings, and supporting the 
states' bills of rights, was an unacceptable omission for 
these dissenting members of the Pennsylvania Convention 
(Ketcham 1986, 247). Anti-Federalist John Dewitt, in his 
essay of October 27, 1787, also complained of the want of a 
bill of rights (Ketcham 1986, 195). He argued that a 
society can never be too explicit in their terms when 
forfeiting rights to the government, or the liberties of the
2"After the Pennsylvania Convention ratified the new 
constitution on December 12, 1787, by a vote of 46 to 23, twenty- 
one members of the minority signed a dissenting address that 
appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser on 
December 18, 1787" (Ketcham 1986, 237).
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people are likely to be trampled upon. "The line," he 
wrote, "cannot be drawn with too much precision and 
accuracy" (Ketcham 1986, 195). Governmental abuse over the 
rights of citizens is what led to the first bill of rights 
being adopted, Dewitt reasoned, and the principle should not 
be forgotten. Citizens must be careful and specific to make 
clear what powers are granted, implied, or reserved to the 
people (Ketcham 1986, 196). Jefferson, in a letter to 
Madison dated March 15, 1789, agreed when he wrote, "The 
declaration of rights will be the text whereby [states] will 
try all the acts of the federal government" (Peterson 1975, 
439) .
A Protection Against Future Abuses
The written character of the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights also lends itself as a protection against future 
abuses. John Dewitt, in an essay written in 1787, argued 
that a bill of rights is an important guard against future 
tyranny. He stated that while the people who originally 
formed the new government may understand that they have 
retained certain rights, they should attempt to deter any 
future claims by tyrants that rights were surrendered by 
"tacit implication" since they were not set aside and 
protected (Ketcham 1986, 197). Silence by the people on 
certain vital points may invite claims to dominion and the 
surrender of the rights of the people.
14
A Rebuttal to the Federalists
Thomas Jefferson attempted to counter Federalist
arguments that by listing a few rights, you may omit others.
As he wrote to James Madison in 1789, "Half a loaf is better
than no bread. If we cannot secure all our rights, let us
secure what we can" (Mason and Baker 1985, 289). Jefferson
continued by noting that,
The inconveniences of the Declaration [of rights] 
are that it may cramp government in its useful 
exertions. But the evil of this is shortlived, 
moderate, and reparable. The inconveniences of 
the want of a Declaration are permanent, 
afflicting and irreparable: they are in constant 
progression from bad to worse (Mason and Baker 
1985, 290).
Even if all of the rights of human beings cannot be secured, 
protection of a few rights is preferable to not having a 
shield for any rights.
CHAPTER 2
BOTH SIDES REEXAMINED
Both sides of the debate make valid arguments, so who 
was right? Public opinion, time, and history seem to have 
validated the Anti-Federalist position. The Bill of Rights 
has worked. The people have embraced it and the courts have 
protected it. The cases in which citizens have claimed 
their rights have been infringed, and have appealed to the 
first ten amendments is legion, especially with the 
extension of these prohibitions to the state governments via 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Anti-Federalist Victories
As the Anti-Federalists hoped, the Bill of Rights can
be a check on the other branches of the government in
advance of the passage of an oppressive measure. Alexander
Hamilton, though an opponent to a bill of rights, recognized
the power of judicial review in Federalist 78:
It not only serves to moderate the immediate 
mischiefs of those which may have been passed but 
it operates as a check upon the legislative body 
in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to 
the success of an iniquitous intention are to be 
expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a
15
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manner compelled, by the very motives of the 
injustice they meditate, to qualify their 
attempts (Rossiter 1961, 470).
Madison was also quite prophetic in his speech before the
House when he stated,
. . . independent tribunals of justice will 
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the 
guardians of those rights; they will be an 
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of 
power in the legislative or executive; they will 
be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon 
rights expressly stipulated for in the 
constitution by the declaration of rights (Barnett 
1989, 60-1).
Claims for free speech, free press, free religion, search 
and seizure protection, and virtually all the other 
guarantees have found their way to the courts, and the 
judiciary has utilized the Bill of Rights to protect the 
liberties of the citizenry. The Bill of Rights has thus 
provided the judicial check, the explicit text to which to 
appeal, and has educated the people and roused their 
support.
Fears of the Federalists Realized
Unfortunately, that is only half the story. The 
Federalists' prediction of the loss of unlisted rights has 
come to pass. Supreme Court justices, as well as legal and 
political theorists, have declared that there are no rights 
beyond those specifically listed in the Bill of Rights. For 
example, in Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479), Justice 
Hugo Black's dissenting opinion rested on the claim that the
17
law challenged in this case was " . . .  not forbidden by any
provision of the Federal Constitution as that Constitution
is written . . . "  (Griswold 527). In the same case, in
which he also dissented, Justice Potter Stewart restated all
of the amendments to which the majority referred in the
decision and declared that not only did the Connecticut law
not violate any of these, but that the Ninth Amendment is
nothing more than a constitutional truism, even narrowing it
to nothing more than a restatement of the Tenth Amendment.
In the course of its opinion the Court refers to
no less than six Amendments to the Constitution:
the First, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, the 
Ninth, and the Fourteenth. But the Court does not 
say which of these Amendments, if any, it thinks 
is infringed by this Connecticut law . . .
(Griswold 527-8).
While the majority opinion supported the expansion of 
individual rights, the opinion has been severely criticized 
as an illegitimate use of judicial power to create rights 
out of thin air. Doe v. Bolton (410 U.S. 179) provided 
similar dissenting comments in regard to the "new" right of 
privacy. Justice Byron White in his dissent wrote that 
there is nothing in the Constitution to support the right to 
privacy. As he commented, "The Court simply fashions and 
announces a new Constitutional right . . . with scarcely any 
reason or authority for its actions . . . "  (Doe 221-2).
In Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186), the majority decided 
that the Court should not expand clauses such as the Due
18
Process Clause - and, we may assume, the Ninth Amendment - 
to protect "new" rights.
Robert Bork, unsuccessful Supreme Court nominee, often 
stated in his nomination hearings that if there is no 
specific provision in the Constitution, the judge should not 
act (Barnett 1993, 2:428). He does not consider the Ninth 
Amendment a specific provision. As he stated, his concern 
with rights such as the privacy right as fashioned by 
Justice William 0. Douglas in Griswold is that it "simply 
comes out of nowhere, that it does not have any rooting in 
the Constitution, it is also that he does not give it any 
contours, so you do not know what it is going to mean from 
case to case" (Barnett 1993, 2:432). Bork went on to state 
that "What we are talking about here was a generalized, 
undefined right of privacy which is not in the Bill of 
Rights" (Barnett 1993, 2:434). Bork denied that the Ninth 
Amendment is a repository for rights, such as the privacy 
right, claiming that to his knowledge, no one ever "knew 
what the Ninth Amendment did mean and what it was intended 
to do" (Barnett 1993, 2:433). Political and legal 
commentators have also denied the existence of unenumerated 
rights. Walter Berns, in his article "The Constitution as a 
Bill of Rights," complained of "judicially created rights," 
and declared that the courts invent rights without any 
regard to the text of the Constitution (Berns 1985, 67, 69). 
Berns argues that there is no such thing as the right to
19
self expression, or abortion, or to be a conscientious
objector. Gary McDonnell, in his essay "The Politics of
Original Intention" wrote, "The Constitution does not speak
of a right to privacy; the Court simply created one"
(McDonnell 1989, 9). L. B. Boudin, quoting Justice Black,
attempts to make this point:
In determining whether an act of the legislature 
is constitutional or not, we must look to the body 
of the Constitution itself for reasons. The 
general principles of justice, liberty, and right, 
not contained or expressed in that instrument are 
no proper elements of a judicial decision upon it 
(Boudin 1988, 134).
Theorists and Supreme Court justices (and a nominee)
demonstrate that the Federalist fears of a loss of unlisted
rights were well founded.
The Constitutionality of 
Unenumerated Rights
Detractors of unenumerated rights fail to recognize 
that there is supporting text in the Constitution for 
unenumerated rights, and that is the Ninth Amendment. They 
also fail to see the innate danger hidden within their 
argument. If the rights specifically enumerated in the 
first several amendments are the only rights Americans can 
claim, all power is left to the government, consistent with 
majority rule, only forbidding precisely what is in the Bill 
of Rights (Dworkin 1992, 384). If this is the case, then 
the very people who decry these unenumerated rights may find 
themselves on the other end of a majority which, as Justice
20
Arthur Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion in 
Griswold, could make laws mandating birth control. After 
all, there is no specific constitutional provision against 
it. At Robert Bork's confirmation hearings, Senator Edward 
M. Kennedy pointed out to him that in Bork's system, 
majorities would be able to do anything they please short of 
violating enumerated rights. This would allow nearly any 
legislation, including compulsory abortion, if a legislative 
majority so desired. Kennedy stated that this is precisely 
what the Bill of Rights was meant to guard against: "There
are some things in America which no majority can do to the 
minority or to the individuals" (Barnett 1993, 2:433).
Even the sweeping changes of time and society stymied 
the emergence of newly recognized rights, or even expanded 
views of enumerated rights, as the case of Olmstead v. U.S. 
(48 S.Ct. 564) demonstrates. In Olmstead, the Supreme Court 
decided that wiretapping was not illegal because it did not 
fit a strict interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The 
majority held that there was not a search and not a seizure. 
In his dissent, Justice Louis D. Brandeis argued that 
wiretapping was something the framers couldn't have dreamed 
of. The founders had no conception of wiretapping, and 
Brandeis cautioned that technology could allow government to 
invade our rights in ways never imagined by the framers, or 
anyone else. Olmstead was subsequently overturned by Berger 
v. New York (388 U.S. 41) and Katz v. U.S. (389 U.S. 342) in
21
the 1960s. In both cases, wiretapping and electronic 
eavesdropping were considered violations of the 
Constitution. Justice William O. Douglas, in his concurring 
opinion in Berger, breathed a sigh of relief: "at long last
it [this case] overrules sub silentio Olmstead v. U.S."
(Berger 64). Although it was finally overturned after forty 
years, Olmstead illustrates the difficulty with which new 
rights and protections are faced.
The benefit of the Anti-Federalists' wisdom has indeed 
acquired Thomas Jefferson's "half a loaf." But as the 
Federalists feared, the Bill of Rights - so far - has 
obtained only the half loaf. The quest now lies in how to 
get a "full loaf." The task is easy, because the framers 
have provided us the ingredients: the Ninth Amendment.
Answering the Federalists
Within the Bill of Rights itself lies the answer to the 
Federalists' objections. The Federalists, as already noted, 
did not want any bill of rights at all. This means, of 
course, that all rights under the Constitution would have 
been unenumerated rights (Barnett 1989, 20) . Surely it 
cannot be debated that the framers would have denied 
protection for rights such as free speech, press, or any of 
the rights of conscience. Had the authors and ratifiers of 
the Bill of Rights known that the rights in those first ten 
amendments would be considered the only rights of the
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people, they certainly would not have settled for so paltry 
a list. In fact, it is only common sense that a clause such 
as the Ninth Amendment should be inserted into the 
Constitution. No text alone is so comprehensive that it can 
cover everything (Grey 1993, 2:202). Norman Redlich 
commented on this point in "Are There 'Certain Rights . . . 
Retained by the People'?"; words are inadequate to define 
all the rights in a free society (Redlich, 1989, 1:145). As 
Congressman Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts argued at the 
time of ratification, the Constitution need not "descend to 
such minutiae" as specifying a right to peaceably assemble 
(Cooper 1991, 424). He stated that such an enumeration 
would have entailed going "into a very lengthy enumeration 
of rights; they might have declared that a man should have a 
right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up 
when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought 
proper . . . "  (Cooper 1991, 424-5). Rights are limitless 
because rights are whatever anyone can think of, so long as 
they do not infringe on the rights of others. Charles 
Black, Jr., in his article "On Reading and Using the Ninth 
Amendment," argued that vague wording in the Constitution is 
a good thing, for by listing rights, we necessarily limit 
them (Black, Jr. 1989). Using the example of cruel and 
unusual punishments, he remarked that if a few punishments 
were prohibited, certainly equally cruel punishments could 
be thought up. Dworkin effectively illustrates why more
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precise language would be contrary to the purpose of the
Constitution. As he argues in Taking Rights Seriously, the
Constitution lays down certain principles and concepts
concerning liberty and justice. Dworkin compares these
concepts to instructions to his children. He writes,
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect 
them not to treat others unfairly. I no doubt 
have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to 
discourage, but I would not accept that my 
'meaning' was limited to these examples, for two 
reasons. First I would expect my children to 
apply my instructions to situations I had not and 
could not have thought about. Second, I stand 
ready to admit that some particular act I had 
thought was fair when I spoke was in fact unfair, 
or vice versa, if one of my children is able to 
convince me of that later; in that case I should 
want to say that my instructions covered the case 
he cited, not that I had changed my instructions. 
I might say that I meant the family to be guided 
by the concept of fairness, not by any specific 
conception of fairness I might have had in mind 
(Dworkin 1978, 134).
Dworkin argues that it is the misunderstanding of the
difference between conceptions and concepts which has
confused our ideas about interpreting the Constitution's
vague clauses. Dworkin asserts that the broad
constitutional clauses represent "appeals to the concepts
they employ, like legality, equality, and cruelty" (Dworkin
1978, 135). He provides the example of the cruel and
unusual punishment provision. He writes that it should not
matter that the death penalty was not considered cruel and
unusual punishment when the amendment was adopted, because
the framers provided us with a concept of cruel and unusual
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punishment, which we must reexamine ourselves, and make up 
our own minds about what is cruel (Dworkin 1978, 135).
The Ninth Amendment steps in where the other amendments 
leave off. It traverses those gray areas where specificity 
and restrictive words seem to work against the purposes of 
justice and liberty, rather than for them. The Ninth 
Amendment responds to the fears of the Federalists that not 
all rights can be listed, and guards against the notion that 
by listing certain rights, all others are forfeited.
Allowing active interpretation of the Ninth Amendment also 
permits the growth and change of our conceptions of liberty, 
and for future generations to be able to respond to the 
crises of their times, addressing John Dewitt's concerns 
about future misunderstandings of what the written 
Constitution actually secured. The human experience is 
marked by change, change in notions, traditions, and in what 
is fundamentally important. Bennett P. Patterson, in "The 
Forgotten Ninth Amendment," wrote that as we become more 
"civilized" we learn and change our views on things, such as 
the women's movement and slavery (Patterson, 1989, 1:124). 
Our rights are evolving, both enumerated and unenumerated. 
The definition of cruel and unusual punishment is different 
today than in the 1800s, as it will be in the future. The 
same will hold true to our definitions of unenumerated 
rights (Black, Jr. 1989, 341). Patterson furnished the 
example of debtors' prison which was common at the time of
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the adoption of the Constitution. There is no provision in 
the Constitution to protect us from this, but debtors' 
prison no longer fits our conception of justice. He 
provided the example of witchcraft, which was punishable in 
the 1800s but would not be punished today. Our ideas of 
what is right and wrong, of justice, and even of the 
Constitution itself, change with time.
The Supreme Court recognized the need for flexibility
in U.S. v. Classic (313 U.S. 299):
In determining whether a provision of the 
Constitution applies to a new subject matter, it 
is of little significance that it is one with 
which the framers were not familiar, and hence, 
the Supreme Court reads its words not as 
legislative codes . . . but as the revelation of 
the purposes which are intended to be achieved by 
the Constitution as a continuing instrument of 
government (1031).
Answering the Anti-Federalists
The Ninth Amendment not only responds to Federalist 
fears, but it serves the Anti-Federalists' hopes as well.
The Amendment provides a clear textual basis for all claims, 
and it serves as a legal check for the judiciary to employ. 
As Calvin Massey wrote in his article, "Antifederalism and 
the Ninth Amendment," unenumerated rights have a textual 
basis so it seems inconceivable that they are somehow not 
protected by judicial review (Massey, 1993, 2:275). Given 
time and usage, the clause may eventually garner the public 
love and respect that will further protect the citizens from
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government intrusions, as people cherish the sentiment that
they have many rights to freely exercise. Hamilton, in
Federalist 84, noted the importance of public support when
he wrote that security of rights depends on "public opinion,
and on the general spirit of the people and of the
government" (Rossiter 1961, 514). Energizing the citizenry
with the notion of liberty through the Ninth Amendment helps
to ensure the future security of individual rights. The
clause is also useful to future generations, allowing the
Constitution to be shaped to fit their crises. "Whatever
the thoughtfulness of a past generation, the one thing that
we can be sure of is that its members did not discern our
particular world and apply their formidable intelligence to
solving its conundrums," and "even the most well-drafted of
statutes can become irrelevant or, what is worse, actively
counter-productive to the very concerns that gave them life
in the first place" (Levinson 1993, 2:143). Giving the
Ninth Amendment its true meaning is necessary, because, "The
rights retained by the people are limited only by their
imagination and could never be completely specified or
enumerated" (Barnett 1993, 2:8). As Immanuel Kant wrote,
No one has a right to compel me to be happy in the 
peculiar way in which he may think of the well­
being of other men; but everyone is entitled to 
seek his own happiness in the way that seems to 
him best, if it does not infringe the liberty of
others in striving after a similar end for
themselves . . . (Olafson 1961, 161).
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The History of the Ninth Amendment
As has previously been discussed, the controversy over 
a lack of a bill of rights in the new Constitution 
threatened its ratification. The Federalists finally 
conceded the point, promising to propose a bill of rights 
after the ratification of the proposed Constitution (Barnett 
1993, 2:178). Of course, the Constitution was ratified, but 
the intended bill of rights was not immediately forthcoming. 
James Madison, though known as the author of the Bill of 
Rights, was not originally in favor of a bill of rights 
(Morgan 1988, 131). In his book James Madison on the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, Robert J. Morgan 
attempts to explain Madison's switch from an opponent of a 
declaration of rights to the author and proponent of the 
Bill of Rights. First, Morgan notes that a response to a 
call for the crafting of a bill of rights might open the 
door to tampering with the proposed Constitution, and would 
complicate the process of ratification (Morgan 1988, 132). 
Madison also concluded that the call for a bill of rights 
was mostly a ploy by Anti-Federalists to defeat ratification 
of the Constitution. In defense of the proposed 
Constitution, Madison promised rights-securing amendments 
after ratification (Morgan 1988, 135). Although the 
Constitution was ratified, and the first elections brought 
in a Congress and President friendly to the new 
Constitution, Madison was still concerned about the Anti-
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Federalist threat. In May 1787 Madison presented his 
proposed amendments to the House. On June 8, 1789, Madison 
urged the House to consider the proposed amendments, warning 
that "Any further delay . . . would create suspicions, at 
least, and might even inflame public opinion among the warm 
supporters of a bill of rights" (Morgan 1988, 137).
Although he recognized the need for other pressing business 
of the new government, Madison hinted that the new 
government may face sharp criticism if a bill of rights was 
not passed. However, he also wanted to ensure that the call 
for amendments did not open the door to tinkering with the 
Constitution, but should be limited to securing rights that 
everyone supported (Morgan 1988, 138). Eventually, Madison 
persuaded a Select Committee of the House to consider 
proposed amendments to add to the Constitution (Barnett 
1993, 2:4). In an attempt to assuage the fears of the 
Federalists, he proposed what would become the Ninth 
Amendment:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the 
constitution, made in favor of particular rights, 
shall not be construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people 
or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the 
constitution; but either as actual limitations of 
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater 
caution (Barnett 1993, 179).
During this speech, Madison clearly explained the true
purpose behind the Ninth Amendment. He said,
It has been objected also against a bill of 
rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions 
to the grant of power, it would disparage those
29
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; 
and it might follow, by implication, that those 
rights which were not singled out, were intended 
to be assigned into the hands of the General 
Government, and were consequently insecure. This 
is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever 
heard urged against the admission of a bill of 
rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it 
may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as 
gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of 
the fourth resolution (Barnett 1989, 60).
This clause was to become the Ninth Amendment.
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the 
Constitution, made in favor of particular rights, 
shall not be construed as to diminish the just 
importance of other rights retained by the people 
. . . (Barnett 1989, 55).
As Joseph Story noted in his Commentaries on the 
Constitution,
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent 
any perverse, or ingenious misapplication of the 
well known maxim, that an affirmation in 
particular cases implies a negation in all others; 
and e converso, that a negation in particular 
cases implies an affirmation in all others (Story 
1987, 711).
The Ninth Amendment received little to no attention 
from courts and commentators up to 1965 (Caplan 1989, 243). 
When it was referred to in early cases, it was often lumped 
in with other amendments, and said to refer only to the 
national government. Bennett B. Patterson, in "The 
Forgotten Ninth Amendment," explains one theory of why the 
amendment has remained on a dusty shelf for so many years. 
According to Patterson, in the case of Fox v. State of Ohio 
(46 U.S. 410), the Court failed to distinguish between the 
first eight amendments and the Ninth when it stated that 
"those amendments" applied only to the national government
(Patterson 1989, 110). Also, in Lessee of Livingston v. 
Moore (32 U.S. 469), the Court stated that "those amendments 
do not extend to the states" (Patterson 1989, 111).
Patterson argues that the Court was referring only to the 
Seventh Amendment, though both the Seventh and Ninth 
amendments were discussed in the case. Patterson believes 
that these confused references to the Ninth Amendment as 
applying only to the national government influenced people 
to ignore it for many years. Patterson does note, however, 
that in Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 
Iowa (134 U.S. 31), the Court ruled that the first eight 
amendments apply to the federal government, leaving the 
implication that the Ninth Amendment applied to the states 
(Patterson 1989, 114).
In 1965, the heretofore uninspired life of the Ninth 
Amendment would be forever changed. The U.S. Supreme Court 
was confronted with the case of Griswold v. Connecticut (381 
U.S. 479) in which the executive director of the Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut and a physician associated 
with the League were convicted as accessories to a crime for 
giving information and advice on birth control to a married 
couple. Charged under an aiding and abetting law, they 
supposedly violated a Connecticut statute that made it 
illegal to use any drug or article to prevent conception.
The case was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court, where 
it became one of the most controversial cases of the
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century, and one which laid the foundation for the 
popularity of Ninth Amendment and unenumerated rights 
claims.
Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court 
which declared that there are certain rights that, while not 
mentioned specifically in the Constitution, have been 
construed to exist under other rights, without which "the 
specific rights would be less secure" (Griswold 482). "In 
other words, the First Amendment, and other amendments, have
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion" (Griswold 483). The Court stated that the 
enumerated rights listed in the Bill of Rights have 
"penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that 
help give them life and substance" (Griswold 484). The 
Court listed the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth 
amendments as the rights that form zones of privacy.
Griswold marked the beginning of the right to privacy, 
followed by such cases as Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113), Doe v.
Bolton (410 U.S. 479), and Eisenstadt v. Baird (405 U.S.
438), which built on the foundation laid in Griswold.
But perhaps more important to the life of the Ninth 
Amendment was Justice Arthur Goldberg's now famous (or, to 
his critics, infamous) concurring opinion. Justice Goldberg 
argued that there are several rights that have long since 
been recognized by the Court despite the fact that they are 
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Goldberg
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went on to say that these rights exist because they are so 
deeply ingrained in the traditions and consciousness of the 
people that they are fundamental. Goldberg directly seized 
upon the Ninth Amendment and used it to underpin his 
opinion. Referring to the Ninth Amendment, Goldberg 
mentioned the fact that the framers thought there were 
additional fundamental rights protected from governmental 
intrusion other than those listed in the first eight 
amendments. "Liberty" protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, he asserted, protects unenumerated rights via 
the Ninth Amendment with the same constitutional force and 
authority as enumerated rights. The unenumerated right that 
was deserving of protection in the Griswold case was the 
right of privacy in marriages, which comes from the 
collective conscience of the people, and "from the totality 
of the constitutional scheme under which we live" (Griswold 
493-5) .
But not all of the justices on the Supreme Court 
thought the decision was a proper one, and many critics 
after the decision have thought the same. Justices Black 
and Stewart joined in dissent in this case, stating that 
while the law was frivolous and "uncommonly silly," it was 
not unconstitutional. While several amendments such as the 
Fourth and Fifth protect a right to privacy at certain 
times, places, and under certain circumstances, there is no 
general right to privacy in the Constitution. Stewart
33
argued that if the people wanted to be rid of this law, they
needed to persuade their representatives to repeal it.
According to Stewart, "That is the constitutional way to 
take this law off the books" (Griswold 531).
Justice Hugo Black, also dissenting, attempted to
refute Goldberg's reading of the Ninth and Tenth amendments.
He claimed that these amendments were meant to limit 
government to those powers expressly granted in the 
Constitution, not to open the door to numerous rights, or 
for the Court to invalidate the laws of the legislatures. 
According to Black, the role of the Court is not to keep the 
Constitution up to date, or in tune with the social 
atmosphere of the times; that is the purpose of the 
representative branches of government. Black also warned 
that use of the Ninth Amendment is a thinly disguised bid 
for judicial power, allowing judges to invalidate any 
legislative acts they do not like. He claimed that with 
constant use of judicial review, and by loosening the rules 
of the Constitution, there would be a great shift of power 
to the courts in violation of the separation of powers.
The complaint of the justices, and of other critics, is 
the same. The legitimate role of the Court is not to strike 
down laws simply because the judges do not like the law. If 
the law is a bad one, there are plenty of remedies for the 
people through their duly elected legislatures.
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Another case in which the Ninth Amendment was appealed
to is Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186) . Hardwick was
challenging an anti-sodomy law, claiming that the statute
violated his privacy rights under the Ninth Amendment, a
"specific constitutional provision giving 'life and
substance' to our understanding of privacy" (Bowers 201).
Justice Byron White delivered the opinion of the Court.
White claimed that the precedents in this area, Meyer v.
Nebraska (43 S.Ct. 625), Griswold, and Roe all dealt with
family, marriage, or procreative rights, not just any sexual
activity between two consenting adults. In order to support
this right according to Griswold, it must be "deeply rooted"
in the national conscience, or must be implicit in the
concept of liberty. White wrote that to even suggest that
homosexual sex is either of these things is "at best,
facetious" (Bowers 194). White argued that homosexual
activity has always been against the law: through common
law, at the time when the Constitution was ratified, and
throughout the states.
Dissenting in this case, Justice Harry Blackmun
asserted that simply because a law has been around a long
time does not make it right. Blackmun quoted Holmes'
observation that
[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule 
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds 
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
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and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of 
the past3 (Bowers 199).
Blackmun argued that we protect marriage and procreation not
because of some social value placed on these things, but
because they are central to individuals in defining
themselves and their lives. He wrote,
The Court claims that its decision today merely 
refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage 
in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has 
refused to recognize is the fundamental interest 
all individuals have in controlling the nature of 
their intimate associations with others (Bowers 
206) .
Blackmun contended that the real danger to this country is 
neither usurpation by the judiciary nor the recognition of a 
nontraditional lifestyle, but rather the refusal to uphold 
minority rights against the prejudices of the majority. He 
wrote,
. . . depriving individuals of the right to choose for 
themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships 
poses a far greater threat to the values most deeply 
rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance of 
nonconformity could ever do (Bowers 214).
The Griswold case heralded dozens of cases appealing to
the Ninth Amendment as an attempt to justify individual
rights (Caplan 1989, 243). The right to smoke marijuana in
the home, the right to an abortion, the freedom to conduct
one's personal sex life without official intrusion, freedom
of movement, the right to wear one's hair any way one wants,
the right to a healthful environment, the right to enjoy
301iver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harvard 
Law Review. 457, 469 (1897).
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natural resources, the right not to wear a crash helmet, the 
right to teach in public schools, the right to sue the 
federal government, freedom from the military draft, the 
right of access to the courts, and the right to engage in 
political activity are just some of the cases that have 
sprung up in the past few decades laying claim to the Ninth 
Amendment (Shaw 1990, 109-111). Not all of these cases have 
succeeded in their claims; but they have, for the first 
time, bolstered their arguments with the "forgotten" Ninth 
Amendment.
The Ninth Amendment and States' Rights
The Ninth Amendment, however, does fail to address one 
major complaint of the Anti-Federalists. It does not 
protect states' rights versus the national government. The 
Pennsylvania Minority objected to the powers described in 
the new constitution since the national government "must 
necessarily annihilate and absorb the legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers of the several 
states . . . ." A proposed amendment to the Constitution by 
the Anti-Federalists demonstrates their concerns. The very 
first amendment desired was "that it be explicitly declared 
that all Powers not expressly delegated by the aforesaid 
Constitution are reserved to the several States to be by 
them exercised" (Ketcham 1986, 242).
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As indicated by the words of the Ninth Amendment, the 
clause speaks to rights retained by the "people," not the 
states. Paradoxically, some current commentators have 
claimed that the sole original purpose of the Ninth 
Amendment was to protect states' rights. They assert that 
the Ninth Amendment was ratified to assure the people that 
all rights protected under the state constitutions would 
retain their full effect under the new system. Robert Bork, 
though not an active proponent of the theory, stated at his 
confirmation hearings that this explanation was the only one 
"that has any plausibility to it that I have seen so far" 
(Barnett 1993, 2:433). The "retained rights" referred to in 
the Ninth Amendment, this theory asserts, are the rights 
existing at the time of adoption in the states' 
constitutions. Raoul Berger supports this opinion in his 
article, "The Ninth Amendment," indicating that the states 
wanted the Ninth Amendment to protect them from a strong 
national government (Berger 1989, 1:208-10). Berger notes 
that at that time, it was the states that were regarded as 
the protectors of liberty, not the national government, and 
the amendment was simply an assurance that these liberties 
would still be intact under the new regime. Added to this 
is the idea that the Ninth Amendment cannot be used to 
invalidate state laws because Madison, the author of the 
Ninth Amendment, originally wanted to insert the clause in 
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, the area
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specifically referring only to the national government 
(Levinson 1993, 2:129). Also, in Adamson v. California (67 
S.Ct. 1672), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not incorporate all of the amendments in the 
Bill of Rights and apply them to the states.
Russell Caplan takes up the torch from there with an 
interesting view of the role of the Ninth Amendment in the 
constitutional scheme. Caplan also supports the view that 
the Ninth Amendment was merely a protective clause for the 
states against the national government, however Caplan takes 
the argument a little further in his article "The History 
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment" (Caplan 1989). He 
argues that the Ninth Amendment was enacted to protect the 
states' pre-existing laws and constitutions, thus the 
amendment is looking back, enforcing things that were in 
effect before the amendments were ratified. Caplan argues 
that the Ninth was meant to be paired with the Tenth 
Amendment, and it is the Tenth Amendment that looks forward, 
protecting the states' power from future encroachment by the 
national government. By pairing these two amendments,
Caplan limits the meaning of the Ninth Amendment to a 
one-shot protection clause of those rights that were 
protected by state constitutions only at the time of 
ratification of the Bill of Rights. Caplan adds a unique 
twist to this argument stating that the Ninth Amendment
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certainly cannot now be used to invalidate state laws since
its very purpose was to protect them.
However, a serious look at history bolsters an
expansive reading of the amendment (Macedo 1993, 2:151).
The real meaning and intent of the framers is shown by the
fact that around the 1800s many state constitutions had
clauses similar to the Ninth Amendment, and thus the people
back then understood it to mean what it says, and not as
some restriction on national power. As John Ely wrote in
his article "The Ninth Amendment,"
The fact that the constitution-makers in, say, 
Maine and Alabama in 1819 saw fit to include in 
their bills of rights provisions that were 
essentially identical to the Ninth Amendment is 
virtually conclusive evidence that they understood 
it to mean what it said and not simply to relate 
to the limits of federal power (Ely 1989, 183).
Since the adoption of the Constitution, twenty-nine states
have added a clause similar to the Ninth Amendment
(Kettleborough 1918). The Constitution of the Confederate
States of America also contained a similar provision
(Barnett 1989, 29). Article VI, Section 5 of the
Confederate Constitution is nearly verbatim of the Ninth
Amendment:
The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people of the 
several States (Kilpatrick 1961, 28).
If the amendment was intended solely to protect states'
rights at the time of ratification, there would be no cause
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for similar provisions for newly formed states in the Union, 
or in the Confederate Constitution.
Early Protection for Unenumerated Rights
Several early cases under the new Constitution also 
show that the founders understood that unenumerated rights 
were deserving of constitutional protection. In Calder v. 
Bull (3 U.S. 386) and Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka 
(87 U.S. 686), the Supreme Court stated that certain 
inherent human rights are entitled to protection even though 
they are not numbered in the Constitution (Patterson 1989,
Is 115). In Calder, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase said 
in the opinion of the Court that there was some legislation 
that, although not specifically restricted by the 
Constitution, could be struck down if it violated certain 
principles of "free Republican governments" (Calder 388).
CHAPTER 3
A WORKING THEORY
The Ninth Amendment has the potential to be a cherished 
protector of liberty. Yet it has remained dormant until 
very recently. Only after the landmark case of Griswold v. 
Connecticut, in which the Ninth Amendment was referred to, 
has the amendment been appealed to with any conviction or 
frequency. Awakening interest in the Ninth Amendment is 
most likely the result of the huge interference on the 
individual of the ever growing bureaucratic state over the 
past fifty years (Arnold 1993, 2:257).
Defining Unenumerated Rights
But what are the rights protected by the Ninth 
Amendment? How do we determine what they are? At his 
confirmation hearings discussing enumerated rights, Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy quipped, " . . .  'Come out, come out, 
wherever you are', looking for the sources and the 
definitions of unenumerated rights" (Barnett 1993, 2:465). 
Perhaps to attempt to define and enumerate unenumerated 
rights would be contrary to the obvious intent and meaning
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of the amendment (Patterson 1989, 120). But, in order to 
protect these rights, there must be some way of determining 
what they are. There are many theories on the definition of 
Ninth Amendment rights. Massey claims that the Ninth 
protects both natural and positive rights just as the first 
eight amendments do (Massey 1989, 1;310-11). Randy Barnett 
writes that unenumerated rights should be protected against 
both illegal means and ends employed by government (Barnett 
1993, 591). According to the Griswold opinion, the rights 
under the Ninth come from three sources: the traditions and
the conscience of our people, experience with the 
requirements of a free society, and the fundamental 
principles of liberty (Caplan 1989, 1:245). Others point to 
the fact that interpreting the Ninth is the same as with the 
rest of the Constitution. It could even be done by the 
"originalist" method of looking at the framers' notes, 
proposed amendments, speeches of the day, and the like 
(Barnett 1989, 35). Interpreting the Ninth could be seen 
the same as giving meaning to the open-ended "necessary and 
proper" clause (Barnett 1989, 37). Or, one could use 
enumerated rights as points of departure to find 
unenumerated rights through "common underlying values"
(Black, Jr. 1989, 347).
The problems with the Ninth Amendment are problems with 
the law in general; in determining means and ends of 
protection, defining what counts, accepting that it may have
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to be redone, and that mistakes are made (Black, Jr. 1989, 
340). The core of the dilemma is that the amendment appears 
to command that we search for unenumerated rights, yet 
provides no clues as to what these rights are, or how to 
determine their meaning. Some skeptics of the Ninth 
Amendment, such as Raoul Berger, have pointed out that if 
the clause is given a broad interpretation, it gives the 
judiciary a "bottomless well" to use at their "limitless 
discretion" (Barnett 1993, 182-3). There are also theorists 
who believe that the Constitution should be read and 
interpreted with the intent of the framers in mind (Maltz 
1993, 2:261). These "originalists" believe that there is no 
way to determine what the framers intended unenumerated 
rights to be, and therefore they are unenforceable. The 
founders wanted rights to be protected from the 
Constitution, not by the Constitution (Maltz 1993, 2:262). 
That is, rights should be protected from encroachment by the 
government. If the government is viewed as the protector of 
rights, it is given a claim to power over the protection and 
enforcement of rights, and the government's power is 
enlarged by the Constitution, rather than restrained by it.
However, supporters of a sweeping reading of the 
Constitution, such as Ronald Dworkin, note that limiting the 
rights of the people to the few listed in the first eight 
amendments, and in the body of the Constitution, gives 
government overwhelming power, and takes the principles of
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the Constitution and reduces the text to "a document with 
the texture and tone of an insurance policy or a standard 
form commercial lease" (Dworkin 1992, 384).
The Presumption of Liberty
Resolving the issue of what is an unenumerated right, a 
right retained by the people, can be accomplished through 
Randy Barnett's theory of the "presumption of liberty." In 
his theory, the judiciary would approach any claim to an 
unenumerated right with the presumption that individuals 
have the freedom to do whatever it is that they are 
claiming. This shifts the burden to the government to 
justify its conduct. If the government cannot defend its 
actions and show that the objective cannot be achieved 
without violations to citizens' rights, then the citizen 
deserves to win and the government deserves to lose (Barnett 
1989, 26). As Justice Brandeis wrote, "every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the [Constitution]" (Schwartz 1968, 171). This 
method does not mean that the government will always lose. 
Rather, it implies a burden of justification upon the 
government to warrant its activities, both in using 
expressly delegated powers and implied, means-oriented 
powers.
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This method is also similar to the technique judges use
in adjudicating cases concerning enumerated rights. For
example, there is a presumption of free speech, and any
governmental intrusion is closely scrutinized (Barnett 1989,
42). Barnett's approach works to limit government, not
expand it. It leaves certain areas that neither state nor
national governments have the power to regulate (Kelsey
1989, 93). It creates a "sea of rights surrounding islands
of government powers," rather than a "sea of governmental
powers surrounding islands of individual rights" (Barnett
1989, 43). This theory was hinted at in U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co. (304 U.S. 144) in the famous Footnote 4, when
Justice Harlan F. Stone wrote,
There may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of 
the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally 
specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth {emphasis added} (Carolene 152).
The Court signaled that the presumption of the
constitutionality of legislation would face a more serious
challenge when the legislation in question impinged upon a
particular clause of the Constitution. Note that the Court
recognized the first ten amendments, which, of course, would
include the Ninth Amendment, as specific provisions that
could test the presumption of constitutionality of
legislation.
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Unenumerated Rights 
Are Similar to Listed Rights
Unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment are not 
so different to interpret as the numbered rights. Despite 
the fact that rights are listed, judges still must interpret 
enumerated rights, because they are vague, general 
declarations of right, just like the Ninth Amendment. As 
Henry Manne noted in his essay "Reconciling Different Views 
About Constitutional Interpretation," "The meaning of words 
are notoriously vague, ambiguous, and volatile . . . "
(Manne 1989, 58). The "enumerated" rights are filled with 
vague and ambiguous terms that must be defined by the 
judiciary. What is excessive bail? What is cruel and 
unusual punishment? What is unreasonable search and 
seizure? The enumerated rights require subjective 
interpretation just as unenumerated rights do.
The First Amendment right to free speech is a good 
example of this concept since it is a broad guarantee that 
has required more narrow definitions of its meaning 
throughout the years. The Court has been asked to interpret 
this right. In the case of Martin v. Struthers (63 S.Ct.
862) the Court held that freedom of speech and the press 
includes the right to distribute literature and the right to 
receive it. There is no textual provision that states this, 
but the Court has interpreted an enumerated right. The 
courts have done this continuously, in determining whether 
free speech is anything from picketing to wearing black
armbands (Black, Jr. 1989, 342). In his essay,
"Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be
Overturned," Dworkin illustrates this point (Dworkin 1992). 
He compares the Court's protection of flag burning under the
First Amendment right to free speech, and the protection
from gender discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause, to the protection of the right to an abortion as an 
unenumerated right. He notes that neither flag burning nor 
protection from gender discrimination are specifically
mentioned in the document itself, but all are guaranteed by
the general principles of the Constitution. The 
interpretation of the enumerated rights to include flag 
burning and gender equality are the same thing as the 
interpretation of unenumerated rights. He claims these 
things do not flow from the intent of the framers, but from 
the political principles that guide our country.
Unenumerated rights can also be seen as having the same 
limits as the listed rights. Richard A. Epstein, in his 
article, "Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust," 
wrote, "Freedom of speech is not the same as an uninhibited 
license to speak . . . ." (Epstein 1992, 45). Courts have 
not interpreted the First Amendment to mean that government 
actions may never in any manner affect speech, but that when 
they do, the government is under a heavy burden to justify 
its conduct (Barnett 1993, 2:27). Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, in the Schenck v. U.S. (39 S.Ct. 247) decision,
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wrote, "The most stringent protection of free speech would 
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded 
theatre and causing a panic" (Schenck 249). In Gitlow v.
New York (45 S.Ct. 625), the Court curbed free speech by 
upholding a New York statute prohibiting speech that 
threatens overthrow of the government by unlawful means. 
Chief Justice Fred Vinson, in Feiner v. New York (71 S.Ct. 
303), wrote that the right to free speech does not include 
the right to incite a riot. Again, in Chaplinsky v. State 
of New Hampshire (62 S.Ct. 766), the right of speech was not 
declared an absolute right. Justice Frank Murphy wrote the 
opinion, stating that Congress can regulate lewd, obscene, 
libelous speech, and "fighting words - those which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace" (Chaplinsky 766) . If the enumerated 
right of free speech can be limited and defined, then 
unenumerated rights would surely face similar limitations.
Recognition of Unenumerated Rights
Many unenumerated rights have already been recognized 
with little controversy about their existence or need to be 
sheltered. In Meyer v. Nebraska (43 S.Ct. 625) the Court 
stated that certain unenumerated rights were necessary "to 
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men" 
(Meyer 626). For example, the right to associate was
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secured in NAACP v. Alabama (357 U.S. 449). The right to 
be presumed innocent was found to exist in Estelle v. 
Williams (425 U.S. 501) decided in 1975. In 1970, in the 
case of In re Winship (397 U.S. 358), the right to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt became a fundamental right in our 
criminal justice system. The right to bring up children and 
direct their education was protected in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters (45 S.Ct. 571). The right to marry, to establish a 
home, and the right to have offspring have all been shielded 
as fundamental rights retained by the people in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma (62 S.Ct. 1110) . Lochner v. New York (25 S.Ct.
539) gave the right to contract, though this case is now 
widely considered illegitimate. The right to forward one's 
own political views was protected by the Ninth Amendment in 
the case of United Public Workers v. Mitchell (37 S.Ct.
556). The right to pursue an occupation without state 
interference was declared in Schware v. Board of Bar 
Examiners (77 S.Ct. 752). The right for the media to attend 
trials is not listed in the Constitution, but became a 
protected right in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 
(448 U.S. 555). In this case, the Court admitted that there 
is no enumeration of this right, but said that traditionally 
the media and public had been attending trials, and this 
right is part of the First Amendment.
In Kent v. Dulles (78 S.Ct. 1113), the right to travel 
was declared. Supporting that decision was the case of
Aptheker v. Secretary of State (378 U.S. 500) in which the 
right to travel at home and abroad was found to be an 
important aspect of liberty. In U.S. v. Guest (383 U.S. 
745), the Court again reaffirmed this right by stating that, 
"The Constitutional right to travel from one State to 
another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept 
of our Federal Union . . . [F]reedom to travel throughout 
the United States has long been recognized as a basic right 
under the Constitution" (Guest 758). The opinion goes on to 
recognize that while the right to travel is not specifically 
listed in the Constitution, it is basic and elementary. 
Again, in Shapiro v. Thompson (394 U.S. 618), the Court 
found that the Constitution guarantees the right of 
interstate travel. In dealing with an uncontroversial 
subject, the Supreme Court "points to the absence of an 
explicit textual home for the right with pride, as a kind of 
evidence of the centrality of the right to the 
constitutional project of which it is indisputably a part" 
(Sager 1993, 2:255).
All of these unenumerated rights have been relatively 
supported because of their uncontroversial nature. The 
criticisms of unenumerated rights arise when controversial 
subjects, such as abortion, are linked to an unenumerated 
right, such as the right to privacy. The right to privacy 
is not so controversial in and of itself, except that the 
legal right to abortion flows from it (Barnett 1993, 2:413).
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The right to privacy has been mentioned by the Court on 
numerous occasions. Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in 
Olmstead stated, "The right to be let alone [is] the most 
comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by 
civilized men" (Olmstead 572). The opinion in Frank v. 
Maryland (79 S.Ct. 804) recognized the "essential right of 
privacy" that is "protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment" (Frank 808). Again, in Stanley v. 
Georgia (394 U.S. 557), the Court wrote, "For also 
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited 
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into 
one's privacy" (Stanley 564).
When the right of privacy comes under assault, it is 
generally due to the controversial nature of a particular 
issue, such as birth control, abortion, or homosexual 
activity, rather than the broad concept of a right to 
privacy. In the case of Poe v. Ullman (367 U.S. 497), 
though the case was dismissed due to injusticiability, 
dissenting justices said that the laws prohibiting use of 
contraceptives were "an invasion of the privacy that is 
implicit in a free society" (Poe 509, 521). In Eisenstadt 
v. Baird (405 U.S. 438), the opinion read, "If the right of 
privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental 
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child"
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(Eisenstadt 453). But the most controversial of the 
"privacy rights" which has brought ire down upon 
unenumerated rights, was the decision in Roe v. Wade (410 
U.S. 113) . In this case, the Court declared that the right 
to privacy encompassed a woman's right to terminate her 
pregnancy if she chose to. In the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the 
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's 
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to 
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy" (Roe 153). The emotional debate over abortion 
and the right to privacy has threatened the recognition of 
other, less controversial unenumerated rights. Similar 
cases with equally unpopular issues have made it to the 
Supreme Court, but not necessarily with the same outcome.
The case of Bowers v. Hardwick (478 U.S. 186) was an attempt 
to strike down sodomy laws which were claimed to deny 
homosexuals their right to privacy and to conduct their 
sexual lives without interference by the government. The 
claim was denied, and the anti-sodomy law was upheld.
As a comparison of the right to travel and the Roe and 
Hardwick decisions illustrate, the acceptance of the concept 
of unenumerated rights has more to do with the actual right
53
claimed, and its controversial nature, than a debate over 
the existence of unenumerated rights.
Judicial Review, Judicial Activism, 
and the Ninth Amendment
Expanded use of the Ninth Amendment is open to the
problems associated with judicial discretion. It has been
argued that the Supreme Court, through extensive use of
judicial review, has usurped power from the other two
branches, and exercises extraordinary powers (Mace and
Melone 1988). Judicial review is the power of the Court to
overturn acts of the other two branches of government, or of
the state governments, as unconstitutional. Activist
decisions are those opinions that do not defer to the
legislative or executive branch, that do not adhere closely
to only specific textual provisions of the Constitution, or
that do not follow original intent. Judicial activism and
the Ninth Amendment seem to go hand in hand. Discussing the
issue at his confirmation hearings before the Senate, Bork
stated,
I do not think you can use the ninth amendment [sic] 
unless you know something of what it means. For 
example, if you had an amendment that says "Congress 
shall make no" and then there is an ink blot and you 
cannot read the rest of it and that is the only copy 
you have, I do not think the court can make up what 
might be under the ink blot if you cannot read it 
(Barnett 1993, 2:441).
Of course, the Ninth Amendment is not hidden beneath an ink
stain. The words are clear, and we know what it says, but
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the problem is that the words do not reveal specific rights 
and provisions. The criticisms of judicial activism, and 
hence of the use of the Ninth Amendment, rely on the 
principles of original intent, majoritarianism, and the 
danger of the personal preferences of the judge deciding 
cases.
Originalism and the Constitutionality 
of Judicial Review
The first claim against the legitimacy of judicial 
review is that this power is simply unconstitutional. The 
power of judicial review is nowhere explicitly mentioned in 
the Constitution. Rather, opponents claim, the Court has 
usurped this power over the years through a series of cases, 
starting with Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137, Mace and 
Melone 1988, 19). Many of the advocates of this position 
adhere to the theory of the intent of the framers, or 
originalist theory. Originalist doctrine demands that 
judges look to the intent of the framers of the Constitution 
to guide them in their decisions. Originalists often claim 
that if the framers had intended to grant the Supreme Court 
the power of judicial review, they would have included 
explicit words in the document to that effect. However, 
since no such phrasing exists, neither should the power.
This theory has severe problems as a serious guide to 
constitutional interpretation. First and foremost, it is 
nearly impossible to discern what the intent of the framers
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actually was. The records of the convention are incomplete,
and offer conflicting testimony. There was more than one
person at the convention, and certainly it cannot be
proposed that all of the framers had exactly the same intent
on every phrase of the Constitution. Also, the intentions
of the state conventions, or even all of the people who
eventually ratified the Constitution are impossible to
discover (Shaman 1992, 39). There is considerable evidence
that the framers were not only aware of the concept of
judicial review, but many actively supported the idea (Beard
1988, 42). In fact, Hamilton clearly indicated judicial
review would be a factor under the new Constitution in
Federalist 16, when he wrote,
If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy 
with the legislature, they would pronounce the 
resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to 
the supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and 
void (Rossiter 1961, 117).
Hamilton also specifically spelled out the powers of the
judiciary in Federalist 78:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and 
peculiar province of the courts. A constitution 
is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges 
as, a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to 
them to ascertain its meaning as well as the 
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the 
legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, that 
which has the superior obligation and validity 
ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other 
words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to 
the statute . . . "  (Rossiter 1961, 467).
Even if all this were not true, the theory of originalism is
still bankrupt for several reasons. As Jeffrey Shaman
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writes in "Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme
Court's Proper and Historic Function," "following the will 
of the 55 persons who supposedly framed the Constitution or 
the smaller group of them who actually participated in the 
framing is hardly an exercise in democracy" (Shaman 1992, 
41). Nor does it say anywhere within the Constitution that 
the rule for interpreting the document is to follow the 
framers' intent. For all of these reasons, originalism 
fails to be a decisive indicator in the debate concerning 
judicial review.
The Undemocratic Nature of 
Judicial Review
Another argument against judicial review is that it is 
undemocratic. It is asserted that nine individuals 
nullifying acts of the popularly elected branches is 
inherently undemocratic (Mace and Melone 1988, 24). In 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (476 U.S. 747), Justice White explains in his 
dissenting opinion that certain "issues in our society are 
best resolved by the will of the people, either as expressed 
through legislation or through the general principles they 
have already incorporated into the Constitution they have 
adopted" (Thornburgh 796). In a democratic society, the 
will of the people is expressed through their legislature, 
and should be given the widest latitude possible. The 
rights retained by the people can be enacted through
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legislatures, through state laws, and through constitutional 
amendments (Berger 1989, 205). The problem with the Ninth 
Amendment, according to Bork, is that it provides no text to 
determine its meaning, and therefore no law for the judge to 
apply. And when there is no law for a judge to apply, there 
is no function for the judge to perform. As Bork states it, 
" [democratic choice must be accepted by the judge where the 
Constitution itself is silent" (Barnett 1993, 2:21).
But the assertion that judicial review is undemocratic,
and hence illegitimate in our system, fails to recognize
that the American system of government is a constitutional
democracy, meaning it is a democracy with limitations on
what the majority may do (Shaman 1992, 41). Justice Robert
Jackson, in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette
(319 U.S. 624), described why this concept is vital to the
idea of liberty,
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of 
political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by courts.
. . . fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections
(West Virginia 638).
Perhaps the Court should be thought of as 
anti-democratic, rather than undemocratic. It can hardly be 
denied that the Supreme Court has undemocratic 
characteristics, but it can be considered anti-democratic in 
that it fosters good democracy. In pursuit of a better 
democracy, the Court acts as a counter-majoritarian force to
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uphold minority rights and facilitate full participation by 
all groups in society (Mace and Melone 1988, 27).
Removing Issues from Public Debate
Some critics of judicial review argue that by allowing 
the courts to make final decisions, important issues are 
removed from public discussion. As Michael W. McConnell 
states in "A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional 
Democracy," republican government is a better way to secure 
rights than by assigning power to judges, and removing 
issues from public debate (McConnell 1993, 93). McConnell 
writes, "We are willing to bear the risk that the community 
will sometimes be wrong because the risks posed by the 
alternatives are worse" (McConnell 1993, 73).
However, despite what the opposition to judicial review 
claims, the Supreme Court is not the final arbiter on 
issues. Judicial decisions are not the final say on any 
subject. "Its decisions are reviewable by Congress, which 
with some frequency overrules them" (Levinson 1993, 144). 
Several amendments have been adopted in reaction to 
unpopular Supreme Court decisions. In Oregon v. Mitchell 
(400 U.S. 112), the Supreme Court ruled on the 1970 federal 
Voting Rights Act which lowered the voting age from 
twenty-one to eighteen in local, state, and national 
elections. In that ruling, the voting age was upheld at the 
national level, but rejected for the state elections because
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the justices ruled that the Congress overstepped its bounds 
of power by making voting requirements for the states 
(Cultice 1992, 171). Within a year, the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment giving the vote to every citizen at the age of 
eighteen, was ratified (Cultice 1992, 214).
Also, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was 
"adopted to overturn an early Supreme Court decision4 that 
an out-of-state plaintiff could sue a state in federal court 
to collect a debt" (Orth 1987, 7). One need only examine 
the abortion issue to realize that a controversy is not 
finally disposed of by a Supreme Court decision.
Personal Biases of Judges
Another argument against judicial review is that judges 
will insert their own preferences into their decisions, 
basing invalidation of laws not on the Constitution, but on 
their own personal biases. Using such vague provisions as 
due process, equal protection, or the Ninth Amendment allows 
judges to nullify virtually anything (Boudin 1988, 137). 
Judicial review used to be an extraordinary power used in 
extraordinary circumstances but now, critics claim, it is 
ordinary and used all the time (Boudin 1988, 137). Analysts 
complain that judges no longer invalidate legislation based 
on whether it is a clear violation of the Constitution, as 
James B. Thayer urges in "The Origin and Scope of the
4Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419.
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American Doctrine of Constitutional Law" (Thayer 1988, 71).
Rather, the new standard is not whether Congress has the
power to pass such legislation, but whether that power is
wisely used (Boudin 1988, 139). It is charged that the
judiciary compares contested acts against their own policy
predispositions, rather than against the Constitution.
Critics fear a powerful judiciary broadly interpreting a
vacuous, limitless clause and shaping the Constitution and
the law into whatever they wish. For example, Raoul Berger
is concerned that the courts will become "Big Brother," and
attempt to control the people. He believes the Court will
use the Ninth Amendment to "make [the people] free and
virtuous if they have to force them to be free and cram
virtue down their throats" (Berger 1989, 218). This
"bottomless well" for the judiciary takes government out of
the hands of the people and into the courts. It leaves the
Constitution open to a judge's opinion of what is right
(McConnell 1993, 76).
[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution, 
according to the fixed rules which govern the 
interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the 
theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to 
control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; 
we are under the government of individual men, who for 
the time being have power to declare what the 
Constitution is, according to their own views of what 
it ought to mean (McConnell 1993, 85).
Commentators claim that judicial review destroys the
judiciary in the eyes of the public, turning it into a
partial, subjective institution, whereas it has always been
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thought of as an impartial body relying on objective law to 
reach its decisions (Massey 1993, 300). Soon the judiciary 
would be relying on religion and morality rather than 
political theory and law (Rapaczynski 1993, 196). Critics 
also claim it causes an imbalance of powers between the 
branches of government (Massey 1993, 300). McConnell argues 
that judges are the worst ones we could enlist to interpret 
the Constitution so broadly for the rest of society. He 
claims they are totally unrepresentative of the people. 
Judges are generally older white men, upper class, isolated, 
and, perhaps most importantly, not accountable in most 
instances of judgeship. Federal judges, and specifically 
Supreme Court justices, are appointed for life, and 
McConnell states, "Power without responsibility is not a 
happy combination" (McConnell 1993, 89).
The fear of judicial tyranny is a valid concern, but 
there are other threats that may be worse. The tyranny of 
the majority is even more dangerous, and it was the one that 
Madison feared the most in his discussions about factions in 
Federalist 10 (Rossiter 1961). It seems only logical that 
in order to protect rights of the minority from the 
majority, or rights of the individual from society, the 
courts must necessarily be the forum for the preservation of 
these rights. "Whereas, the enumerated powers of Article I 
operate against the states and the people, the judicial 
power of negation operates against the other branches"
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(Barnett 1993, 2:42). Individual rights are the rights 
most likely to be infringed by legislatures, so it is the 
unique duty of the judiciary to protect them (Massey 1993, 
275). Judges are isolated from the whims of the majority, 
and thus are better equipped to protect the rights of the 
minority which may be vulnerable to neglect or abuse by the 
other branches of government (Sager 1993, 244). As McIntosh 
notes, in "On Reading the Ninth Amendment: A Reply to Raoul
Berger," enforcement and encroachment are two different 
things (McIntosh 1989, 226). Protecting rights and 
enforcing them against the other two branches is not the 
same as infringing rights.
Controls on the Judiciary
While the problem of a zealous judiciary exists, it can
be guarded against. There are several factors that limit
the power of judges. As Hamilton argued in Federalist 78,
The judiciary . . . has no influence over either 
the sword or the purse; no direction of either the 
strength or of the wealth of the society, and can 
take no active resolution whatever. It may truly 
be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid 
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments (Rossiter 1961, 465).
The judiciary must rely on the compliance of the other
branches, and of the people.
Judges have to justify their decisions, both to others 
in the legal profession and to the public (Melone 1988,
263). Judges are constrained by stare decisis, statutes,
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and the Constitution. Justices are subject to impeachment, 
and must be appointed by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate. The judiciary is bound by certain principles of 
adjudication, such as adhering to precedent, the "case or 
controversy" limitation of Article III of the Constitution, 
and certain maxims of self restraint, such as deciding on 
grounds other than constitutional controversies if possible, 
and avoiding "political questions" (Carr 1942, 185-197).
Finally, judges can only strike down offending 
legislation, not enact new laws (Barnett 1993, 2:19). 
Judicial review does not necessarily expand the power of the 
courts, rather it can be seen as limiting the power of the 
other two branches. Judicial review is negative and 
limiting, indicating that "the brakes of our constitutional 
machinery are more important than the ignition system"
(Mason 1987, 437). Coupled with this idea is that the true 
value of judicial review is not nullification, but 
validation of laws. If the Court has the power to overturn 
a law, yet supports that law, it legitimizes the actions of 
the other branches of government, or the acts of state 
governments (Black, Jr. 1989, 11). The Court thereby adds 
to the legitimacy of the actions of the other two branches, 
and supports the idea of limited government, by indicating 
that there are certain boundaries that the legislature may 
not cross (Black, Jr. 1989, 11).
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Judicial Restraint and Activism
Proponents of judicial activism cite that judicial 
review is necessary for some important reasons. First, as 
John Marshall asserted in Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137), 
judicial review is a necessary power of the courts.
Building on Article III and the Supremacy Clause, Marshall 
noted that the government that the Constitution set up was 
meant to be a limited government, and the only way to 
constrict government is to oblige government to watch 
itself. In order to accomplish this, the Constitution set 
up a semi-independent branch to check the other two. If 
Congress were to pass an ex post facto law or bill of 
attainder, where else but the courts could injured parties 
seek relief? Majoritarians claim that is up to the people 
to fix, but if unpopular minorities' rights are violated, 
the majority is unlikely to be a fair judge in its own cause 
(Black, Jr. 1989, 8-10). Minority rights are to be 
protected, even at the discomfort of the majority. As 
Black, Jr. argues in "The Building Work of Judicial Review," 
while not everyone will agree with the decisions of the 
Supreme Court, we can agree on the process. When the 
government is obliged to be the judge in its own case, the 
system must provide for as much of an independent, impartial 
arbiter as possible. He writes that the judiciary provides 
the independence and specialized knowledge necessary to make
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the system as fair as it can be (Black, Jr. "Building Work," 
1989, 9).
The conservatives in contemporary politics argue that 
the "liberal" Court has twisted the Constitution and 
rendered it a hollow document into which it can pour its own 
meaning. However, judicial activism is not limited to one 
party or ideology. Daniel Novak asserts in his article 
"Economic Activism and Restraint," that the Marshall and 
Taney courts were activists in the economic realm supporting 
business (Novak 1984, 80). Indeed, the Lochner era has been 
criticized for its economic activism. In a study examining 
the decisions of "restraintist" judges, Anthony Champagne 
and Stuart S. Nagel found that judicial restraint is 
actually often used to support certain policy preferences.
If judicial restraint is not applied consistently, without 
regard to what interests may benefit by its use, then it 
isn't really restraint. Restraint must not be concerned 
solely with results (Champagne and Nagel 1984, 316).
In a similar study, Harold J. Spaeth and Stuart H.
Teger examined levels of judicial deference to legislative 
acts to determine if judges were really restraintist or 
activist. They found that judges tended to vote to uphold 
their personal biases. "The point here is not to argue that 
the justices are activists, but rather to show that 
considerations of activism and restraint are absent from 
their decision making. Considerations of substantive policy
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control the justice's voting behavior" (Spaeth and Teger 
1984, 295).
Judges' decisions seem primarily rooted in their own 
prejudices, and so do the criticisms of the use of judicial 
review. Melone and Mace argue in their article, "Judicial 
Review: The Usurpation and Democracy Questions," that
"positions on judicial activism versus restraint often turn 
on whose ox is being gored. Yesterday's liberals often 
criticized the Court for its activism; today it is the 
conservatives who condemn the Court for the same sin" (Mace 
and Melone 1988, 78). "Whenever the Supreme Court renders a 
decision that someone doesn't like, apparently it is not 
enough to disagree with the decision; there also has to be 
an accusation that the Court's decision was illegitimate, 
being based upon the justice's personal views and not the 
words of the Constitution or the intent of the framers" 
(Shaman 1992, 37). To disagree with the Court's opinion 
does not somehow invalidate its role as interpreter of the 
Constitution. No American agrees with every law ever passed 
by Congress, yet we abide by the laws because the process 
has been accepted as legitimate. Let the same now hold true 
for the judiciary.
The Future of the Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment is in its infancy in constitutional 
interpretation and adjudication. The future of the clause
67
is uncertain as commentators debate about its true meaning, 
and about the role it should play in our system. Is the 
Ninth Amendment a mere ghost ship, a wayward clause that has 
no substance? Or is it, as Randy Barnett believes, a 
lifeboat? Barnett's analogy compares the Constitution to a 
majestic ship, designed never to sink. The designers expect 
that it will stay afloat forever, but they add lifeboats 
anyway, even though the designers hope they will never be 
needed. After many generations on this ship, the passengers 
forget what many of the devices on this ship are, including 
the lifeboats. Suppose, then, that some crisis occurs, and 
the boat begins to sink. As Barnett asked, "Would it make 
any sense to argue that passengers should refuse the 
lifeboats or life preservers because it was 'never intended' 
that they use them?" (Barnett 1989, 27-8). Of course, it 
would not. As the Ninth Amendment becomes more recognized, 
the Amendment, and the rights it protects, should be taken 
seriously enough to break out the life preservers. The 
individual rights of Americans need not go down with the 
ship.
Despite its lack of protection for the states, the 
Ninth Amendment can still be a powerful tool to secure 
liberty. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists were both 
insightful in their arguments concerning a bill of rights. 
The Bill of Rights has been a great bulwark against 
government invasion into private rights, and thus the
Anti-Federalists are vindicated. But the Federalists were
also proven right, albeit mournfully so, that the listing of
certain rights for protection is a dangerous enterprise.
The Ninth Amendment is the key to capturing the best of both
worlds: a declaration of rights with the guarantee that
there are other rights deserving of protection besides the
few mentioned. We cannot ignore the obvious text of the
Ninth Amendment, for, as Dworkin notes, "The idea that the
Constitution cannot mean what it says ends in the unwelcome
conclusion that it means nothing at all" (Dworkin 1992,
392). The Supreme Court stated in the Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia opinion,
The concerns expressed by Madison and others have 
thus been resolved; the fundamental rights, even 
though not expressly guaranteed, have been 
recognized by the court as indispensable to the 
enjoyment of rights explicitly defined (Richmond 
580) .
Perhaps this declaration was a bit premature, but, except 
for the states' rights argument, the possibility for 
reconciling this two hundred year old debate about the best 
method to protect individual rights lies as near as full 
recognition of the role of the Ninth Amendment.
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